On Tuesday, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Business Court’s award of summary judgment against a shareholder of three private corporations in High Point Bank & Trust Co. v. Sapona Manufacturing, Inc.  We wrote about the Business Court’s ruling last year, but here’s the quick recap:  The estate of a woman who was the daughter and granddaughter of the founders of three family-originated corporations in Randolph County sued those businesses seeking the redemption of over $3.6 million worth of stock. 

The estate asserted a Meiselman claim, seeking dissolution on the grounds that the decedent had a reasonable expectation that her shares would be repurchased by the corporations upon her death and that the corporations had frustrated that expectation by refusing to redeem the shares.  Judge Tennille dismissed her claim on the grounds that the expectation, even if subjectively held by the decedent, was not held by all of the other shareholders and that her expectation was therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Tennille’s opinion in all material respects.  The insufficient evidence of a shared understanding and expectation of a right of redemption consisted of the repurchase of one shareholder’s stock after his death in 1997, two corporations issuing a tender offer in 1997, and one corporation issuing another tender offer in 2000.  Rather than establishing an expectation of repurchase, this evidence "establish[es] a precedent that the corporation will ‘from time to time’ offer to purchase shares up to a certain amount and at a specified price."

In a footnote, the Court noted Judge Tennille’s analysis that there is a theoretical limit on the size of a corporation that can still be liable under Meiselman.  (In contrast to certain lending houses that were "too big to fail," these corporations would be "too big for plaintiffs to succeed").  Although the Court of Appeals did not really take a position on this part of the Business Court’s analysis, the size and breadth of the ownership base is relevant to several factors:  the likelihood of antagonistic relationships with and dominance by a single majority shareholder; the number of other shareholders whose own expectations would need to mirror the plaintiff’s in order for her to prevail; and the equity of dissolution toward shareholders who don’t play a role in the oppressive conduct.  These factors become nearly impossible for shareholder plaintiffs to satisfy once ownership is spread beyond more than a handful of people.

Full Opinion

In North Carolina, the "notice" portion of notice pleading has long been honored more in the breach.  A recent Business Court order perhaps signals that enough is enough, at least when multiple plaintiffs each are suing multiple different defendants.

Allen v. Land Resource Group of North Carolina, LLC is the oldest of a growing number of cases currently pending before the Business Court involving real estate developers who went bankrupt before their developments were completed.  The original complaint in Allen involved 22 plaintiffs, 29 defendants, and 15 causes of action.  As Judge Tennille described it,

Each plaintiff participated in his or her own transaction involving a specific lot or lots.  Each plaintiff may have dealt with different defendants, including different salespeople, different appraisers, and different banks, and each plaintiff may have had a different level of knowledge. The defendants are varied and include officers and owners of the development company as well as administrative employees and salesmen who had no ownership or control of the company, appraisers, banks and even TV show producers.

(The latter reference is to an HGTV Dream Home located in one of these now-defunct developments on Lake Lure).  After being directed to plead their fraud and misrepresentation claims with greater specificity to satisfy Rule 9(b), Plaintiffs filed a 795-paragraph, 107-page amended complaint, which the Court still found deficient under the pleading rules:  "The Amended Complaint still does not clarify which claims are asserted by which plaintiff against which defendant.  Complaints in similar cases suffer from the same deficiencies. The largest problems are created by the indiscriminate references to all ‘Defendants’ when specific defendants should be identified."  In fact, the Court included a citation to the rarely seen Rule 10(b), which requires that each paragraph of a pleading "be limited to a single set of circumstances and that each claim is founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence."

Procedurally, the Court reached its last straw when certain defendants filed a motion to sever claims and the Court was unable to decide the motion based on the state of the pleadings.  The Court included a threat of sanctions if the situation did not improve:

Rule 11 ensures that counsel have done their homework before filing claims, particularly those involving fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud.  Having done the work required by Rule 11, there is no excuse for not properly pleading separate causes of action that put each defendant on notice of the claims asserted against that defendant.  Failure to properly plead separate causes of action and to identify specifically the party against whom a claim is asserted may be an indication of a Rule 11 violation.

The Court ordered the Plaintiffs to file a "Statement of Claims" within 30 days — even going so far as to provide a form attached to the Order.  Each plaintiff will be required to file a separate form for each defendant whom he is suing, listing the claims that plaintiff is asserting against that specific defendant.

North Carolina lawyers have wondered whether the Iqbal and Twombley decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court will ever trickle down to state court.  Judge Tennille’s order in Allen does not shed much light on that question because a complaint that is unclear as to which plaintiff is suing which defendants falls short of even a properly understood notice pleading regime.  The Allen order, however, is a welcome clarification that the "notice" part of notice pleading is not a superfluous term.

Full Order

UPDATE 9-27-2010:  Judge Tennille issued a similar order two days later in an unrelated case, NNN Durham Office Portfolio I, LLC v. Highwoods Realty L.P.  There, the Court ordered the Plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint with separate responses by each Plaintiff to eight different questions posed by the Court.  You can read the questions in the order here.

The Court of Appeals faced that rarest of truffles this week:  an outcome-determinative choice of law question.  The Court adhered to its traditional roots and rejected a new test fashioned by the Business Court.

At issue in Harco Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Grant Thornton, LLP was an audit of a company providing bail and immigration bonds in North Carolina and other states.  The plaintiff, an insurance company, entered into an agreement with the bonding company on the basis of that audit.  When the bonding company went defunct, the plaintiff ultimately became liable for $15 million in bonds issued in North Carolina alone.

Conflict of laws professors seeking exam questions, take note of these facts:  The plaintiff is an Illinois corporation who paid most of the $15 million from its corporate bank account in Illinois, but did not pay any of that money to any Illinois recipient.  The audit itself was performed by the defendant in Pennsylvania and the audit report was delivered to the bonding company in that Commonwealth as well.

Unlike many choice of law disputes, this one actually made a difference due to the great variety of standards among states for auditor liability to third parties not in privity with the auditor.  The plaintiff argued that North Carolina law applied and, under North Carolina law, the defendant would not be entitled to summary judgment.  The defendant argued that Illinois law applied and that no liability was possible under that state’s law.

As we noted last April, the Business Court went its own way, determining that Pennsylvania law applied.  In doing so, Judge Tennille held that the law of the state in which an audit is performed should govern the auditor’s liability to third parties not in privity.  The Business Court’s analysis was premised on principles of certainty, predictability, and the avoidance of forum shopping.

The novelty of this approach clearly bothered the Court of Appeals in its somewhat tersely-worded opinion:

The Business Court’s Audit State test seems to be the only such test of its kind.  Our research has not revealed a single case in any jurisdiction that purports to utilize such a test for the purpose of determining the choice of law in an auditor liability
case. As the Business Court’s order acknowledges, claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation are claims sounding in tort.  It is the nature of the cause of action, not the occupation of a defendant, that controls the determination of the applicable choice of law test.  While the Business Court expressed concern that “[u]sing the law of the state where the injury occurred is problematic[,]” it was required to apply the lex loci test to plaintiff’s tort claims pursuant to the prior holdings of our Supreme Court and the doctrine of stare decisis.

In other words, a tort is a tort is a tort, and any deviation from the First Restatement: Conflict of Laws (1934) will be punished.  (The Second Restatement, at not yet 40 years old, apparently lacks the gravitas necessary for such issues).

Applying the traditional lex loci test, the Court of Appeals held that Pennsylvania, although the site of the alleged misrepresentations, was not the site where the injury was felt.  Nor was Illinois, the location of Plaintiff’s business.  Instead, the place of harm was North Carolina, in which the plaintiff’s funds were seized by the Department of Insurance.

Note that the Court of Appeals affirmed the Business Court’s denial of the defendant’s summary judgment motion under Illinois law.  Because the Business Court determined that Illinois law did not apply, the denial of summary judgment was appropriate.

We present two items today for the consideration of our loyal readers:

1.  Shameless Plug for Your Votes

The good people at Lexis, which hosts our firm’s legal blogs and many others, recently notified us that we have been nominated for consideration as one of Lexis’s Top 25 Business Law Blogs.  If you are a registered member of the LexisNexis Business Law Communities, please feel free to put in a kind word at this link.  If you are not a registered member but are so compelled that you want to register for free in order to talk us up, you are a wonderful human being.

As with the Oscars and Emmys, it’s an honor just to be nominated.  Also as with the Oscars and Emmys, our adherence to that statement improves greatly if we win.

 

2.  Less Shameless, More Practical Request for Opinions and Orders

From time to time readers ask how we monitor the dockets of the various courts on which we report.  Without revealing all eleven of our herbs and spices, some courts (such as the Fourth Circuit) have convenient email subscription services; some (like the North Carolina appellate courts) release opinions on specified days; and some (like the Business Court) feature an electronic architecture that enables us to monitor it through the use of proprietary software.

Federal district court and bankruptcy court opinions, however, are almost impossible to monitor without racking up salary-sized PACER charges.  Our reporting on those courts is largely dependent on tips from readers.  If you are involved in or otherwise aware of an order or opinion of note on an issue of North Carolina business law, especially in federal trial courts, please feel free to email us.  We are happy either to acknowledge the contribution or preserve the contributor’s anonymity, depending upon your preference.

Thank you as always for your continued readership.

An entity can be interested (legally) in the outcome of a lawsuit, or it may simply be interested (in the go-sports-team-from-my-hometown-or-university! sense) in the outcome.  Under a recent Business Court ruling, only the former supports intervention under Rule 24.

Time Warner Entertainment Advance / Newhouse Partnership v. Town of Landis involved access to utility poles, a type of dispute committed to the Business Court under 2009 legislation. The North Carolina Association of Electric Cooperatives ("NCAEC"), an organization of 26 electric membership corporations across North Carolina, sought leave to intervene under Rule 24 as a defendant aligned with the Town.  NCAEC admitted that it had no direct interest in the outcome of the dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant, but was concerned about the potential precedential effect of a ruling that would establish a methodology for use in future cases.

The Court denied NCAEC’s request to intervene.  First, NCAEC could not intervene as of right because it had neither a statutory right to intervene nor an interest relating to the specific property or transaction (i.e. the particular utility poles at issue).  "Instead, NCAEC has at best a general interest in the precedent that may be set in this case regarding the methodology for calculating pole attachment rates, terms, and conditions, which the Court concludes is insufficient to allow intervention as of right pursuant to Rule 24."

NCAEC could not intervene permissibly either.  Rule 24(b)(2) requires a common question of fact or law for permissive intervention, and the Court held that NCAEC had not put forth any claim for relief for any ripe dispute.  According to Judge Diaz, allowing intervention would force the Court to issue an advisory opinion in advance of any actual dispute between NCAEC and any cable provider.  Moreover, allowing intervention and the addition of new counterclaims would threaten the statutory mandate that utility access disputes be resolved by the Court within 180 days of commencement.

The Court permitted NCAEC an opportunity to be heard, however.  To the extent that future proceedings in the case involved the question of the rate methodology to be applied by the Court, the Court allowed NCAEC leave to appear as amicus curiae on that one issue.

Full Order

 

As discovery of electronically-stored information ("ESI") becomes more prevalent and relevant in litigation, so too does litigation regarding the obligation to preserve ESI.  Last Friday, the Business Court issued two orders reaching opposite results on motions for "non-spoliation" orders, based on significant differences between the scope of the preservation obligations that the plaintiff sought to impose.

In Capps v. Blondeau, the Business Court previously ruled that an arbitration clause was unenforceable.  Two defendants appealed that ruling and, during the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff moved the Court for what they called "non-spoliation" orders (essentially, orders that parties preserve ESI) one against a defendant and one against Wachovia Bank.  In a pair of orders, the Court allowed the motion as to Wachovia but denied the motion as to the defendant.

Judge Jolly discussed several principles of note in the order denying the motion against the defendant, Morgan Keegan:

  • As is typical in Case Management Orders in the Business Court, the CMO in this case already contained a mandate that the parties preserve relevant information, including ESI, until the conclusion of the lawsuit.  This suggested that a further order on the subject was unnecessary.
  • When a lawsuit has already been filed, "the potential parameters of the claims – and the evidentiary importance of relevant information – are apparent."
  • The Court’s duty is to "weigh and balance the respective rights and interests of the parties" when determining the scope of any preservation obligation.

The Court examined the categories of information proferred by the plaintiff and determined that the breadth of those requests prevented the Court from entering any order that would impose a preservation obligation for specific information:

Many of the categories of Information defined in the Motion are stated in the form of either a request for production of documents and materials or in the form of interrogatories, and are not focused on the stated concept of Information preservation.   In substance, the requests are so broadly and loosely defined that the court is forced to conclude that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to enter a preservation order without micro-managing the preservation initiative to such an extent that the result likely would impose an unjust result on either Plaintiff or Morgan Keegan.   An order from this court requiring preservation of such Information would be difficult, if not impossible, for Morgan Keegan in good faith to obey or for this court to police.

In a footnote, the Court identified specific concerns about the scope of those requests:  "For example, the Motion makes multiple use of broad qualifying words such as ‘any’ and ‘all’ ‘records’ or ‘communications’ about a particular subject.  It also uses qualifiers seeking to preserve information about occurrences, events or ‘communications’ that took place ‘at all relevant times.””

In contrast, the Court allowed plaintiff’s motion for an order against Wachovia, a third party who was served with a subpoena duces tecum.  There were three key differences between Wachovia and Morgan Keegan.  First, Wachovia was not a party and was not subject to the CMO, so a separate order was conceivably more necessary.  Second, Wachovia, unlike Morgan Keegan, never filed a response in opposition to plaintiff’s motion.  Third, the scope of Wachovia’s information that plaintiff sought to preserve was clearly and specifically outlined in the requests attached to the subpoena.  The Court listed and ordered preservation of those specific categories of information, such as signature cards, account statements, and transaction details for specific bank accounts.

In the end, however, the Court’s reluctance to enter an order against Morgan Keegan did not mean that its preservation obligations were lessened:

The duty of Morgan Keegan and other party litigants to preserve Information relevant to the issues is apparent. The potential ramifications and available sanctions of a violation of that duty also are apparent. The court expects that Morgan Keegan and all other parties will discharge those duties appropriately and in good faith.

There are two takeaways for Business Court litigators.  First, if there is a CMO in place, preservation obligations already have been ordered against the parties, and the Court is likely to perceive a subsequent motion as superfluous.  Second, to the extent that a party wants to impose a preservation obligation, use of typical discovery terminology like "any" and "all," rather than identifying specific categories of information, will hamper that party’s ability to impose an enforceable obligation on its opponent.

 

If you have visited the restroom in an office building in the last five years, chances are you’ve had the opportunity to use Georgia Pacific’s hands-free paper towel dispenser known as "enMotion."  In a published opinion released yesterday, the Fourth Circuit generally ruled in GP’s favor on trademark infringement, tortious interference, and unfair and deceptive trade practices claims.

The enMotion dispenser (pictured here) operates through an electronic motion sensor that dispenses towels without any physical contact from the user’s hands.  The dispenser was designed for use with a proprietary paper towel sold exclusively by GP, one that the Fourth Circuit described as having "a soft-fabric like feel created by using a through-air-dried (TAD) process."  (Our own end-user experience confirms that these towels are quite supple, as commercial paper towels go).  The dispensers are not sold, they are leased to distributors, who are permitted to sub-lease them to end-users (like office buildings).  The leases and subleases require the end users to use only GP’s towels in the dispensers.  The towels themselves are a non-standard size.

The defendant designed and manufactured a competing paper towel in the exact same non-standard size, but with a "slick, scratchy feel," and marketed it to users of the enMotion dispensers.  Those towels did not fit any other dispenser on the market.

GP sued in the Eastern District for trademark infringement, Lanham Act and common law unfair competition, and tortious interference with contract, and the defendant counterclaimed for unfair and deceptive trade practices.  Judge Boyle granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on GP’s claims and in favor of GP on the defendant’s unfair & deceptive counterclaim.

The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded everything except the counterclaim.  Without delving too deeply into the trademark issues, suffice it to say that the court was convinced that a fact issue existed due to statistical evidence of substantial consumer confusion as to the source of the towels, combined with evidence of the defendant’s intent to "stuff" the GP dispensers with its own towels.

As for the tortious interference claim, the district court ruled that the defendant’s conduct was legitimate competition and was therefore justified, creating a qualified privilege under North Carolina law.  The Fourth Circuit vacated that ruling with two caveats.  First, GP’s claim would be limited to tortious interference with contracts between GP and its distributors because GP did not have contractual relations with the end users themselves.  Second, GP could prevail only if it also prevailed on its trademark claims.  Success on those claims would make the defendant’s conduct illegal, which would destroy the qualified privilege.

Finally, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the defendant’s unfair & deceptive trade practices counterclaim (describing the district court’s reasoning with the Blackstonian phrase "right on the money").  Although the defendant claimed that GP’s attempts to exclude other towel manufacturers from its dispensers was unfair or deceptive, the court held that GP entered into its leases "in good faith, openly, and transparently."  Moreover, the defendant had shown no actual injury because it had been successful in competing with GP in the marketplace.

Full Opinion

Be careful what you request in your complaint, particularly if it’s a request for judicial dissolution.  According to a Court of Appeals opinion this week, you’ll be stuck with that request if your defendant asks for the same thing.

In Bradley v. Bradley, a husband-wife team were the shareholders and officers of a legal recruiting firm, Laura Segal & Associates ("LSA").  When the couple separated, the business basically did too — the wife asserted that the husband misappropriated corporate funds and denied her access to the company’s books, records, and accounting software.  The husband alleged that the wife was trying to usurp the intellectual property of LSA, freeze the husband out of the business, and terminate his employment.

The husband filed a complaint seeking judicial dissolution, appointment of a receiver, and damages for breach of fiduciary duty.  The wife counterclaimed for judicial dissolution or appointment of a receiver.  The trial court entered a TRO and later a preliminary injunction preventing the parties from taking various actions against each other and "established a procedure allowing the management of LSA’s accounts receivable and payable without the parties having to directly interact with each other."

The husband filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his dissolution and receivership claims.  The trial court set aside the voluntary dismissal and granted summary judgment on the defendant’s counterclaims for judicial dissolution and appointed a receiver.

Three legal issues of note arose in the Court of Appeals opinion:

  • The trial court properly set aside the husband’s voluntary dismissal of his dissolution and receivership claims.  The voluntary dismissal was void on its face because, once the wife asserted counterclaims arising from the exact same transactions, the husband lost the authority to voluntarily dismiss claims without the wife’s consent.
  • The husband could not challenge the wife’s right to dissolution because his own complaint pled facts supporting dissolution (and, of course, he requested dissolution himself).  The husband was not allowed to contradict his judicial admissions.
  • The Court rejected the husband’s assertion that the appointment of a receiver should be reviewed de novo.  Instead, the Court followed earlier cases reviewing such appointments for abuse of discretion.

 Full Opinion

If you didn’t think a case with a $55 million default judgment could get more interesting, you were wrong.  The Business Court awarded a total of $82 million in damages this week against a company that successfully set aside the lesser default judgment.

In Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. TradeWinds Airlines, Inc., three airline-related plaintiffs sued a lessor of large airplanes.  The lessor was funded by deep pockets including George Soros, but not so deep as to enter an appearance before entry of default.  One of the plaintiffs went around its compatriots, moving for and obtaining a $55 million default judgment, then entering bankruptcy in order to avoid further proceedings.  We posted last April about an order in which the Business Court declined to rule during the pendency of a bankruptcy stay, but in which the Court gave strong hints about its likely ruling once the stay was lifted.  Last September, those hints became rulings, as the default judgment was set aside (although the entry of default remained in place).

So what did the defendant gain by having a $55 million award set aside?  An $82 million judgment instead, following a 6-day bench trial.  Here’s how the Court got there:

  • Two of the plaintiffs (Coreolis and TradeWinds Holdings) lost a combined $11,544,000 that they had to pay in settlement of claims against them due to the defendant’s fraudulent inducement.
  • TradeWinds itself suffered almost $2.7 million in repair costs, $6.2 million in lease payment losses, and $7.2 million in other damages due to engine failures, for a total of $16.1 million.
  • The allegation amounting to unfair and deceptive trade practices were deemed admitted due to the entry of default, so both awards were statutorily trebled.  That resulted in over $34 million in damages to Coreolis and Tradewinds Holdings and over $48 million for TradeWinds.

It wasn’t all bad news for the Defendant — in a separate Order, the Court declined to award attorneys’ fees.  The Court found that, because the case was intertwined with efforts to pierce the defendant’s corporate veil in New York (to reach Soros and others), this particular case was not capable of resolution, and thus was not the subject of an unwarranted refusal to settle.  In addition, the Court criticized the damages sought by TradeWinds Holdings and Coreolis that were in excess of the ultimate award:  "If those damage claims did not cross the border of speculation, they reached the very edge of the line."

In what Judge Tennille described as a "close case," the Business Court reconsidered and reversed the prior dismissal of a breach of fiduciary duty claim, but the principles it outlined should not give litigants high hopes for reconsideration motions in general.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. involved an investor suing its advisors over investments gone bad.  The Hospital Authority asserted a number of claims against Wachovia, including a breach of fiduciary duty claim that the Court dismissed last October on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Discovery ensued, and at the end of discovery Plaintiff moved to reconsider the dismissal of the fiduciary duty claim under Rule 54(b).  Several points from the order are worth noting.

First, the Court adopted the federal Rule 54(b) standard, which allows for reconsideration of interlocutory orders at any time before final judgment, but which has judicially-created, policy-based limitations to situations:  "(1) where there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) where there is additional evidence that was not previously available; or (3) where the prior decision was based on clear error or would work manifest injustice.”

Second, the plaintiff did not argue an intervening change in controlling law, but instead asserted a new legal theory — that as a federally registered investment adviser, one of the Wachovia defendants was a fiduciary as a matter of law.  Rather than new law, this argument was based on a 1963 U.S. Supreme Court case and a 2003 decision from the Eastern District of Virginia.  The Court was troubled by the assertion of a new theory on a motion to reconsider:

Motions for reconsideration do not serve as an avenue for a party to “present a better and more compelling argument that the party could have presented in the original briefs.”   Madison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp., 402 F. Supp. 2d 617, 619 (M.D.N.C. 2005).  Generally, when a party “fails to present his strongest case in the first instance,” he loses the “right to raise new theories or arguments in a motion to reconsider.”  Duke Energy Corp., 218 F.R.D. at 474.  Nonetheless, had Plaintiff presented this newly raised argument initially, it would have affected the Court’s decision.  Metropolitan’s status as a federally registered investment advisor provides the strongest case for asserting clear error of law in the Court’s October 9, 2010 Order.  However, the fact that a party did not make its strongest and best case on prior submissions will not, standing alone, justify reconsideration.

Third, Plaintiff also asserted that newly discovered facts justified reconsideration.  The Court did not believe Plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s status as a federally registered investment advisor was a fact not available until discovery.  On the other hand, Plaintiff provided facts adduced during discovery that demonstrated the existence of a special relationship of trust and confidence.

The Court was troubled by the fact that discovery occurred on a dismissed claim, but determined that justice required reconsideration and reversal of the dismissal:

This Court is not inclined to encourage parties to conduct discovery on claims that have already been eliminated in hopes of finding grounds for reconsideration.  Litigation is complex and expensive enough as it is without conducting discovery on claims that have already been dismissed.  Furthermore, viewing Plaintiff’s position charitably, many of the “new” facts adduced could have related to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim as well as its breach of fiduciary duty claim.

However, the newly discovered facts, if true, would have impacted the Court’s earlier decision.  These new facts contradict the facts on which the Court previously relied.  The Court, therefore, will set aside the concerns expressed herein and hold fast to its ultimate responsibility—reaching “the correct judgment under law.”

In reconsidering the dismissal, however, the Court noted the inequity of allowing Plaintiff to take discovery on the dismissed claim while Defendants relied on the dismissal by not seeking discovery relevant to that claim.  To remedy the situation, the Court ordered discovery by Plaintiff to be closed, but allowed Defendants a 90-day period to conduct discovery on the revived fiduciary duty claim.

Full Order

[Ed. note:  The Business Court has been busy this week issuing orders at a rate faster than your humble author has been able to comment upon them.  Stay tuned for more posts in the coming days on some other recent orders of interest.]