After a case is designated to the Business Court, the Clerk of Court in the county in which the case is pending no longer has the authority to grant a motion for extension of time.  In this case, per Business Court Rule 9.2, the Court struck the Order entered by the Clerk granting an extension

The electronic filings on the Business Court website are public records, which the public has the right to inspect.  The Court’s power to place filings under seal, or to limit the public’s right of access, is permitted “when there is a compelling countervailing public interest and closure of the court proceedings or sealing of documents

N.C. Gen. Stat.  §41-23, which repealed the common law Rule Against Perpetuities as well as the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (N.C. Gen. Stat. §41-15) as they apply to trusts created or administered in North Carolina is constitutional.

The prohibition against “perpetuities and monopolies” found at Article I, Section 34 of the North Carolina Constitution

When a Court is considering whether to apply the law of a foreign country, as permitted by Rule 44.1 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure:

  • The Court has "[b]road authority to conduct [its] own independent research to determine foreign law," but no duty to so.
  • Both parties have the burden to "raise[]the issue

The issue here was whether a Plaintiff located in Winston-Salem which held a state trademark registration was entitled to an injunction against a competing store with a similar name located in Charlotte.

Judge Diaz applied federal Lanham Act principles in deciding whether the Plaintiff had a sufficient market presence in the Charlotte area to warrant

The Court struck an Entry of Default which had been signed by an assistant clerk of court in the county where the case had been filed.  The entry of default was signed after the case was designated to the Business Court.  Judge Diaz cited Business Court Rule 15.1, stating:

Because the above-captioned cases are Business

The Court ruled that Defendants’ appeal, following an adverse judgment on liability, did not affect a substantial right even though the damages phase of the trial remained.  The Court found that it had continued jurisdiction over the case and that it could proceed with the damages phase notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal. The Court