The Internet advertising activities of the Defendants, including the use by Defendants of Plaintiff’s trademark to generate "sponsored links" in a Google AdWords campaign and the use of the Plaintiff’s trademark in metatags, supported personal jurisdiction in an infringement action. The case, Market America v. Optihealth Products, Inc, was decided by Magistrate Judge
Advising an out-of-state defendant whether it is subject to personal jurisdiction is often a judgment call. There is no bright line test when minimum contacts are involved.
The 2-1 decision today by the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Rossetto USA, Inc. v. Greensky Financial, LLC, in which two Georgia LLCs challenged personal jurisdiction, illustrates that pretty…
The Court of Appeals held on June 17, 2008 in Dailey v. Popma that a defendant’s Internet postings, even though available in North Carolina and causing injury in North Carolina, aren’t sufficient for personal jurisdiction unless the postings are "targeted" to residents of the State.
In Dailey, the plaintiff claimed that Popma had posted…
A service of process issue and a covenant not to compete issue in one decision from the Business Court. It doesn’t get any more exciting than this. But, seriously, this is a significant procedural decision from the Court, please read on. (As always, there is a link to the full opinion above).
On the service issue, the delivery of the Complaint to one of the Defendants, Carnie, had not been made in precise compliance with Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Sheriff had left the Summons and Complaint at Carnie’s house in South Carolina, but had not delivered it personally to Carnie and had not left it with another person at the residence. According to Carnie’s Affidavit, the papers had been "left stuck in a crack between my doors" by a Deputy Sheriff with the last name of "Fudge."
The Court overruled the Motion to Dismiss for insufficiency of service of process because it found that Carnie had evaded service. Looking at federal decisions, Judge Tennille ruled that leaving the Summons and Complaint at Carnie’s residence was adequate service given Carnie’s efforts to evade proper service.
But the groundbreaking part of the the decision on the service issue was the Court’s ruling that Carnie had waived his objection to service because he had filed a Notice of Designation of the case to the North Carolina Business Court. Judge Tennille held that "the filing of a Notice of Designation in an action constitutes a general appearance for the purpose of personal jurisdiction." Thus, the objection to the sufficiency of service was waived.
The Court’s decision goes beyond service of process. Most significantly, if you are representing a Defendant planning to move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, you will waive that argument by filing a Notice of Designation to the Business Court. To keep it alive, the Notice of Designation must contain an objection to personal jurisdiction. Carnie’s Notice did not.
A panel of the Court of Appeals split today on the legal standard for when a corporate officer can be subject to personal jurisdiction based on contacts created through his or her capacity as an officer.
In Saft America, Inc. v. Plainview Batteries, Inc., the Court reversed the trial court’s determination that there was jurisdiction over the defendant’s president, who had conceded visiting plaintiff’s factory in North Carolina. The Court held that "personal jurisdiction over an individual officer or employee of a corporation may not be predicated merely upon the corporate contacts with the forum." The majority ruled that all of the president’s actions were in his official capacity as a corporate officer, not in his individual capacity, and reversed the trial court’s finding of jurisdiction.
Judge Arrowood dissented, so this issue may be headed for clarification by the North Carolina Supreme Court. Here is the key quote from the dissent:
Burgess v. Vitola, 2008 NCBC 4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008)(Diaz)
Plaintiff sued the defendants, thirty out-of-state dentists and lawyers, charging that they had forced advertisements for their services onto his computer. He alleged that this had been accomplished by a “bug, worm, or virus.”
Plaintiff based jurisdiction on N.C.G.S. §1-75.4(4)(a), which allows for the assertion of jurisdiction when “solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State or by or on behalf of the defendant.”
The Court didn’t agree and granted the Motion to Dismiss, holding “it makes absolutely no sense that Moving Defendants, all of whom operate law or dental practices in states far removed from North Carolina, would have any interest in soliciting [plaintiff], or any other North Carolina resident.” The defendants, via affidavits, had denied such interest, although many of them did have "passive" Internet websites.